Abstract. We characterize the maximal sets of preferences under which generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof. Those domains are de®ned by a quali®ed version of single-peakedness, which depends on the distribution of power among agents implied by each generalized median voter scheme.
Introduction
This paper investigates the connections between single-peakedness and strategy-proofness. Whether or not nontrivial strategy-proof social choice functions exist depends on the environment where we want them to operate. When alternatives can be represented as points in a rectangular grid, and preferences are single-peaked, generalized median voter schemes are strategyproof. Outside those situations, nontrivial strategy-proof social choice functions may still exist, but they are harder to ®nd: domain restrictions become less natural.
Single-peakedness of the agent's preferences is often assumed in the existing literature and it is certainly a useful requirement toward the existence of nontrivial strategy-proof social choice functions. In some environments it is su½cient to guarantee it, in others it needs to be combined with additional restrictions. But it is always there. This leads us to investigate, in the present paper, the extent to which some form of single-peakedness might be necessary for strategy-proofness, as well as su½cient.
Our answer is partial, because it only refers to generalized median voter schemes, but it is precise. We start from any such scheme F , and we characterize the maximal set of preferences under which F is strategy-proof. It turns out that the condition characterizing this maximal domain is a quali®ed version of single-peakedness. Previous results in the same vein include Barbera Á, Sonnenschein, and Zhou [4] , Serizawa [10] , and Barbera Á, Masso Â , and Serizawa [3] . Our results improve upon these previous results in several directions. We allow for all types of generalized median voter schemes, by not ruling out the existence of vetoers or dummies. We also cover restricted domains under which the range of generalized median voter schemes might not be a cartesian product.
We have chosen to keep this introduction short, leaving further motivational remarks and examples for Section 2, which contains the de®nitions and a statement of our result. This is proven in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
De®nitions, notation and the theorem
Agents are the elements of a ®nite set N f1Y 2Y F F F Y ng. We assume that n is at least 2.
Alternatives are K-tuples of integers numbers. For integers aY b e Z, with a`b, we will denote the integer interval aY b aY a 1Y F F F Y b f g . A Kdimensional box B is a cartesian product of K integer intervals:
where B k a k Y b k and a k`bk . A subbox of B is any box A contained in B. We endow B with the L 1 ± norm. That is, for every e B, k k K k1 j k jX
Given Y e B, the minimal box containing and is de®ned by
Preferences are binary relations on alternatives (or subsets of alternatives). Let U be the set of complete, transitive and asymmetric preferences on B. Preference pro®les are n-tuples of preferences on B, P e U n . Preference pro®les P P 1 Y F F F Y P n are also represented by P i Y P Ài when we want to stress the role of i's preference. For P e U and A t B, we denote the alternative in A most preferred by P as t A P , and we call it the top of P on A. Therefore,
is the unconstrained top of P.
The range of a social choice function F XP 1 Â Á Á Á ÂP n 3 B, is denoted by R F . That is,
Social choice functions require each agent to report some preference. A social choice function is strategy-proof if it is always in the best interest of agents to reveal their preferences truthfully. Formally,
De®nition 2. Let F XP 1 Â Á Á Á ÂP n 3 B be a social choice function and let P i eP i . The set of options left open to the other agents by i declaring P i is de®ned as follows:
We shall consider di¨erent restrictions on preferences, all of them related to single-peakedness. The ®rst one is a natural extension of this classical condition and has been already used in the literature; see for instance Barbera Á et al. [1] , Serizawa [10] , and Barbera Á et al. [2] . The second one refers to any set O of K-dimensional alternatives. The third one involves three sets O, A, and D. We present these de®nitions in sequence for the bene®t of the reader, since the ®rst one is very natural while the others are a bit harder to interpret. Formally, though, we need only one of them (De®nition 5).
Our ®rst condition is a natural extension of single-peakedness and it coincides with the classical version when K 1. It says that whenever alternative is closer than g to the best alternative t B P (lies on the minimal path from t B P to g, in the sense of the L 1 -norm) then Pg.
De®nition 3. A preference P e U is single-peaked if Pg for all Y g e B ( H g) such that e MB t B P Y g X Preferences satisfying De®nition 3 are characterized by the following two properties. The ®rst one is goodwise single-peakedness: those preferences, restricted to sets of alternatives di¨ering only on one component, are singlepeaked. The second is peak-separability: the best alternative for those preferences on such one-dimensional sets are the projection of the global best on the set. 1 Our next de®nition involves a subset O t B and imposes conditions only on elements of this set. Therefore, it is weaker than De®nition 3 and it coincides with single-peakedness whenever O B.
Finally, the third de®nition refers to three di¨erent sets O, A (O t A), and D. Preferences will be restricted on the two sets O D and A D, but not in the same way. They will be required to be single-peaked on O D, although the reference point will be the top of P on A, t A P , instead of the unconstrained top, t B P . In addition, they will also be required to respect some milder restriction on A D n O D . In applications, O will be the set of options left open by an agent, under a given social choice function, D will be a subset of alternatives where the agent is not a dummy and A will be the range of the social choice function. We will say that a preference P is single-peaked on O relative to A, whenever D A and P satis®es De®nition 5.
Single-peakedness and single-peakedness on O relative to A and D are related concepts but they de®ne sets of preferences which are not necessarily subsets of each other. To see that there are single-peaked preferences which do not satisfy De®nition 5, consider the case where
g , and the single-peaked preference 1Y 1
and g e A D. Obviously, a single-peaked preference on O relative to A and D may not be single-peaked because the ordering between some pairs Y g e BnD is free while it is not for a preference satisfying De®nition 3.
Next, we de®ne generalized median voter schemes. This class of social choice functions are interesting multidimensional extensions of the basic idea of median voting. Additionally, several papers have shown that, in this and similar settings,2 they are strategy-proof rules under single-peakedness.
is a correspondence W k that assigns to every k e B k a nonempty collection of nonempty coalitions W k k satisfying the following conditions:
where each L k is a left-coalition system on B k . Similarly, a family R of rightcoalition systems on B is a collection R k f g K k1 where each R k is a right-coalition system on B kX Moreover, given a left (right)-coalition system W k on B k we say that W e W k k is a minimal left (right) coalition if for every
For a preference pro®le P P 1 Y F F F Y P n e U n , A t B, and k e B k , denote by t
Á the vector of tops on A, and de®ne the coalition to the left (right) of k at t A P by
be a family of left (right)-coalition systems on B and let A t B. The social choice function F A XP 1 Â Á Á Á ÂP n 3 A is called a generalized median voter scheme de®ned by L (R) if it can be de®ned as follows: for every P eP 1 Â Á Á Á ÂP n and every
Notice that our de®nition is relative to the set A, since two preference pro®les P and P H with the same top t B P t B P H outside of A may lead to di¨erent choices under F A , if their tops on A are not the same. However, this will not happen if A itself is box-shaped. Also notice that a generalized median voter scheme F A respects unanimity on A and therefore the range of F A contains A. Hence, when we write F A XP 1 Â Á Á Á ÂP n 3 A we implicitly understand that the range of F A is the set A.3 Before proceeding, it is useful to understand the relationship between right and left coalition systems, R k and L k that produce the same outcome for all t
It is easy to see that R k and L k will select the same outcome for all t
Our de®nition of generalized median voter schemes induces some distribution of power among agents. Some agents may never be able to in¯uence the outcome at all: they are dummies. Some agents may always dictate the outcome to be in a speci®c subset: they are decisive. Some agents may avoid some outcomes, if they want: they are vetoers. These possibilities are some times global, but they can also be de®ned in a local sense: power may depend on the alternative under consideration and also on each of the dimensions de®ning this alternative. The de®nition below makes all these notions precise.
and F A XP 1 Â Á Á Á ÂP n 3 A be its associated (minimal) right-coalition system and generalized median voter scheme, respectively.
We say that agent i is
Remark 2. The following relationships result from Remark 1.
(1) Assume that a k k`bk : (1.a) if agent i is left dummy at k then agent i is right dummy at k 1, and (1.b) if agent i is left vetoer at k then agent i is right decisive at k 1.
(2) Assume that a k`k b k : (2.a) if agent i is right dummy at k then agent i is left dummy at k À 1, and (2.b) if agent i is right vetoer at k then agent i is left decisive at k À 1.
The de®nition of a decisive agent follows Serizawa [10] . Notice that its power is weaker than what the name may suggest. If i is left decisive at k , then he can guarantee that the outcome will not be strictly above k . In other words, i can veto all values strictly above k .
De®nition 9. We say that F
A is a generalized median voter scheme without dummies if for all k 1Y F F F Y K the set of left (right) dummies at k is empty for all k e a k Y b k .
Our next de®nition requires the domain of the social choice function to be su½ciently large: this avoids cases where strategy-proofness might be trivially obtained because agents' preferences are almost ®xed.
De®nition 10. We say that a domainP 1 Â Á Á Á ÂP n is rich on A t B if for all i e N and e A there exists P i eP i such that t A P i .
The richness condition simply requires that there should be, for each alternative, at least one admissible preference ranking this alternative as best. This is a standard assumption (see, for instance, Barbera Á, Sonnenschein, and Zhou [4] and Serizawa [10] ). Notice that if a domain of preferences is rich, its supersets are also rich.
As a starting point, we remind the reader the following result. Let i e N. For any k 1Y F F F Y K, let d k be the maximal level such that i is right decisive in R k , and let v k be the minimal level such that he is a right vetoer in R k . Then any P i eP i is single-peaked on
k P i ggX Our results improve upon this one in several directions. In order to motivate our contributions, let us ®rst rephrase the essential intuition behind Theorem 1. The set S P i is almost the option set o P i , i.e. the set of alternatives that, given that i votes P i , may be the ®nal outcome, depending on the votes of others. Precisely,4
Then, Theorem 1 requires that i's preferences are single-peaked on S P i . This statement is equivalent to requiring that (a) P i is single-peaked on o P i , and (b) v k is worse than any point di¨erent than v k in MB t
.5 (This rewording may seem arti®cial, but wait). In fact, singlepeakedness on o P i is necessary. But, because agent i, by changing his preference from P i to P H i , can change these options, and shift the outcome, a further requirement is also necessary: other points which might be attained by declaring preferences other than P i must be worse than some points in the option set. Serizawa's condition requires this for the point v k only (and does so implicitly). If we want to get a condition which is not only necessary but also su½cient for strategy-proofness we must require it explicitly and for a (generally) larger set of alternatives.
To be more speci®c, consider Example 1, which shows that the set of single-peaked preferences on S P i is still too large in the sense that with those preferences generalized median voter schemes may be manipulable. In view of this, we proceed as follows. We provide necessary and su½cient conditions for strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes for the general case where the range is not necessarily equal to B. Before that, in order to allow for better comparison with Serizawa's result and to proceed more smoothly, we state an intermediate result which maintains the nondummy condition and highlights one of the directions of our extension. Since it will become a Corollary of Theorem 3 (proven in Section 3), we state it without proof.
Theorem 2. Let F
A XP 1 Â Á Á Á ÂP n 3 A be a generalized median voter scheme with rich domain on A without dummies. Then, F A is strategy-proof oñ P 1 Â Á Á Á ÂP n if and only if for every i e N and every P i eP i , P i is singlepeaked on oP i relative to A.
Example 2 below illustrates that the non-dummy condition in Theorems 1 and 2 is very restrictive because many generalized median voter schemes do not satisfy it. It is obvious that any maximality result should exclude agents which are dummies at all points, but there is a wide gap between the trivial case where an agent is dummy everywhere and those where he might be dummy locally, especially in a multidimensional setting.
Example 2. Consider a one-dimensional problem B 1 Y 10 with ten alternatives 1`Á Á Á`a 10 , and agents i and j i H j in a set N f1Y F F F Y ng where n 3. De®ne the generalized median voter scheme F B as follows:
fN nfigY N nf jgg, and L m 10 2 N nj. Notice that although agent i is only left dummy at 1 , F B does not satisfy the non-dummy condition, and therefore we can not apply Theorems 1 and 2.
Consider a generalized median voter scheme
) and let i e N and k e K be given. Consider the set of points fx Notice that since D2 fBg, any single-peaked preference P 2 on oP 2 is indeed single-peaked on oP 2 relative to B and D. Consider any preference P 1 eP 1 such that t
B is strategy-proof we must have, for instance that Before proving the main result of the paper we illustrate, in Example 4 below, that the class of preferences identi®ed in Theorem 3 may be very large, indeed. Following Le Breton and Sen [7] we say that a preference P 1 e U is top unconditional for agent 1 if given Le Breton and Sen [7] show, in a more general set up, that the maximal domain of preferences under which this coordinatewise dictator F B is strategyproof is precisely TU 1 Â TU 2 . We will see that, even though preferences on TU 1 are far from being single peaked, the set of top unconditional preferences for agent 1 coincides with the class of preferences identi®ed in Theorem 3.6 Given F B , and since agent 1 is a dummy at every 2 H 1 2 we have that
gg. Moreover, since agent 1 is never a dummy at any 1 e B 1 , we have that 
Proof of Theorem 3
Let A t B be a subset of alternatives and let F A XP 1 Â Á Á Á ÂP n 3 A be a generalized median voter scheme de®ned by R fR k g K k1 (and L fL k g K k1 ) with rich domain on A. Since the set A will be kept ®xed throughout the proof we will omit its use as a superscript; that is, in this section, F and t should be understood as F A and t A . Let i e N, k 1Y F F F Y K and P i be a preference ordering inP i . De®ne:
if the set is nonempty
6 We omit the argument for agent 2 since it is identical after interchanging the role of the coordinates.
3X5
Lemma 1 below describes, for any given generalized median voter scheme, the exact shape of the set of options left open by an agent i to the other agents. Lemma 1. BP i oP i .
Proof. Let e BP i . For every j H i, consider any P j eP j with the property that tP j . We will show that F P i Y P Ài . Let k 1Y F F F Y K be arbitrary and de®ne the set S f j e N jt k P j k g; by construction, N nfig t S.
that is S N, which implies that S e L k k X By construction, the set S f j e N jt k P j k À 1g is either empty or is equal to the set
Since k e K was arbitrary, we have that e oP i .
Let e oP i . That is, there exists P Ài eP Ài such that
Notice that if t k P i k the result follows immediately by (3.3) and (3.4). Assume ®rst that t k P i ` k . It implies that a k P i ` k . De®ne the set S f j e N jt k P j k À 1g. Since F P we know that S f L k k À 1. However, since i e S we have that
Since k e K was arbitrary, we have that e BP i . 9
Necessity
Let F be strategy-proof onP 1 Â Á Á Á ÂP n . Consider i e N, P i eP i Y and D e Di. Let g e A D and e BP i D MBtP i Y g be such that
Proof. The proof is based on the choice of a pro®le such that, when i declares his top tP i on A, then obtains, but i could change the outcome to g by voting for g. To ®nd such pro®le, we will divide the proof into two di¨erent cases. Case 1. Assume that K 1 H jX That is, there existsk such that gk`k tkP i and i is not a left dummy at gk because gkY k e x tk Y x t1 k À 1 for some 0 t Tk and gk`k. Let S t N be such that i e S e L m k gk, and consider P Ài where for every j e N nfig, P j eP j is such that
which exist since Y g e A and F has rich domain on A.
First, for every k f K 1 K 2 we have that N nfig r f j e N jt k P j k g k g. Using the fact that Y g e BP i we will show that
but from these two conditions we could conclude that
Therefore, we would have that g k k`m infv i k 1Y t k P i g a k P i , contradicting the hypothesis that Y g e BP i . Hence,
Second, for every k e K 1 the set f j e N jt k P j k g contains the set N nfig. Since e BP i by hypothesis, N nfig e L k k and therefore
The set f j e N jtkP j gkg is equal to S nfig. Since S nfig f Lkgk we must have that
Third, for every k e K 2 the set f j e N jt k P j ` k g is either empty, in which case F k P i Y P Ài k , or else it is equal to the set fig. But since
It is straightforward to see that from (3.6), (3.7), (3.8) , (3.9) , and the hypothesis of Lemma 2 it follows that F P i Y P Ài .
Consider any P i eP i with the property that tP i g, which exists since g e A and F has rich domain on A. Now, F P i Y P Ài e MBY g because for every j e N we have that tP j e fY gg. Consider again the coordinatek e K 1 and the set S f j e N jtkP j gkg, which belongs to L m k gk. Therefore, FkP i Y P Ài gk, which implies, by the hypothesis of Lemma 2, that F P i Y P Ài g. Since F is strategy-proof onP 1 Â Á Á Á ÂP n we must have that P i g. Case 2. Assume that K 1 j and K 2 H jX That is, there existsk such that gk b k tkP i . Notice that i is not a right dummy at gk because gkY k e x tk Y x t1 k À 1 for some 0 t Tk and gk b k. Let S t N be such that i e S e R m k gk, and consider P Ài where for every j e N nfig, P j eP j is such that
First, for every k f K 2 we have that F k P i Y P Ài g k k since N nfig r f j e N jt k P j k g k g and i is neither a right-decisive nor a right-vetoer agent at k g k . Therefore,
Second, for every k e K 2 the set f j e N jt k P j k g contains the set N nfig. Since i is not a right-vetoer agent at k (remember that e BP i ), we have that N nfig e R k k . Therefore,
Moreover, the set f j e N jtkP j gkg is equal to S nfig. Since S nfig f Rkgk we must have that
It is straightforward to see that from (3.10), (3.11), (3.12) and the hypothesis of Lemma 2 it follows that F P i Y P Ài .
Consider any P i eP i with the property that tP i g, which exists since g e A and F has rich domain on A. Now, F P i Y P Ài e MBY g because for every j e N we have that tP j e fY gg. Consider again the coordinatek e K 2 and the set S f j e N jtkP j gkg, which belongs to R m k gk. Therefore, FkP i Y P Ài gk, which implies, by the hypothesis of Lemma 2, that F P i Y P Ài g. Since F is strategy-proof onP 1 Â Á Á Á ÂP n we must have that
Proof. Given g and , there will exist 1 , 2 Y F F F Y hÀ1 , h g such that, for each j, BP i D MB j Y j1 f j Y j1 g. Speci®cally, we can choose such j 's by letting j1 be one of the closest elements (in the L 1 -norm) to j in BP i D MB j Y g. Now, to prove Lemma 3, apply successively Lemma 2 and the transitivity of the preference ordering P i . 9
Lemma 4. If g f BP i then P i g.
Proof.
For each j e N consider any P j eP j such that tP j g, which exists since g e A and F has rich domain on A. Obviously, F P 1 Y F F F Y P n g. The proof will consists of two steps.
Step 1: We want to show that a k
But this is immediate, because by de®nition of option set F P i Y P Ài e oP i , and by Lemma 1, we have that
Step 2: We want to show that for all k 1Y F F F Y K:
To show 1 assume that k g k and notice that the set f j e N jt k Pj g k g contains N nfig. Therefore,
To show 2, assume that g k`k and notice that the set f j e N jg k t k P j g is equal to N. This implies that g k F k P. Since e BP i we know that a k P i k , but because
From Steps 1 and 2 we have established that g H F P i Y P Ài e BP i MBY g. Since fY gg r DY from (1) and (2) we have that F P i Y P Ài e DX Moreover, since F is strategy-proof and F P g we must have
Notice that e MBtP i Y g H and g H e BP i D, implying that the hypothesis of either Lemma 2 or Lemma 3 is satis®ed. Therefore, we can deduce that P i g H and by transitivity of P i we can conclude that P i g. 9
Su½ciency
Assume that F is not strategy-proof. Then, there exist i e N, P P 1 Y F F F Y P n eP 1 Â Á Á Á ÂP n and P H i eP i such that F P H i Y P Ài P i F PX 3X13
Denote by P the pro®le P H i Y P Ài and let g F P and F P. We want to show that there exists D e Di such that e BP i D MBtP i Y g and g e A D. First, notice that F P i Y P Ài implies that e oP i , and therefore, by Lemma 1, we have that e BP i .
Lemma 5. e MBtP i Y g.
Proof. To show it, assume ®rst that k`tk P i . We will show that g k k .
Since F k P k we have that S f j e N jt k P j k g e L k k and because i f S we have that S t f j e N jt k P j k g e L k k by condition 1 in the de®nition of a left-coalition system. Then, clearly F k P k which is the desired result because g k F k P. Assume that k b t k P i . We will show that k g k . Since F k P k , the set S f j e N jt k P j k À 1g f L k k À 1 and because i e S we have that f j e N jt k P j k À 1g t S f L k k À 1 implying that g k F k P k . Finally, if k t k P i we do not have to prove anything since the minimal box condition for dimension k is irrelevant; that is, g k could be both higher or smaller than k t k P i . 9
Lemma 6. There exists D e Di such that fgY g r DX Proof. We have to show that:
(1) If g k`k then i is not left dummy at x for every g k x` k , and (2) If k`gk then i is not right dummy at x for every k`x g k .
We will show only 1, since the argument to show 2 is the symmetric one using right instead of left coalitions. Assume g k`k t k P i . The inequality k t k P i follows from Lemma 5. By condition (3.13) the coalition S f j e N jt k P j g k g f j e N nfigjt k P j g k g is not a member of L k g k since g k`k F k P. However, S f j e N jt k P j g k g e L k g k since F k P g k implying that i e S and S nfig S f L k g k which in turn implies that there exists T t S such that i e T and T e L m k g k which means that i is not left dummy at g k . Let g k`x`k be arbitrary. By de®nition of left coalition system S e L k x and by condition (3.13) S nfig t f j e N jt k P j xg f L k x. Therefore, there exists T t S such that i e T and T e L m k x. Hence i is not a left-dummy agent at x, which shows 1. 9
Conclusion and ®nal remark
We have characterized the maximal domains of preferences under which generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof. The extent of these domains depends on the distribution of power among agents which is implied by each generalized median voter scheme. It is still an open question whether some form of single-peakedness is necessary for a domain of preferences to admit some strategy-proof social choice function (not necessarily a generalized median voter scheme). An interesting partial answer is provided in Berga and Serizawa [5] .
